The relationship between the pursuit of science and the practice of medicine has been a theme of abiding interest among medical historians. In consequence, we now possess a substantial body of research and writing which explores the ways in which science and medicine have interacted with one another from the early modern period to the present. One recurring theme in this literature has been to highlight instances of tension and conflict between medical science and clinical practice, or between medical scientists and clinical practitioners. I should declare at the outset that I do not question the findings of such case studies: plainly scientists and clinicians did on many occasions come into conflict with one another. However, I would argue that historians of science and medicine have tended systematically to over-estimate the significance of such cases. Specifically, they have tended to suppose that tension between medical science and clinical practice has not just been an occasional occurrence, but is actually the normal or typical state of affairs, rooted in a divergence of culture and interest so profound that it is sometimes seen to constitute an essential difference between the two enterprises. Such suppositions have in turn informed historiographical practice, leading historians to concentrate on cases which confirm their assumptions regarding the normality of tension and conflict, and to regard those instances of cooperation that demonstrably did occur as exceptional and hence unrepresentative of the normal run of science-medicine relations.
or that medical science in early twentieth-century Glasgow became "isolated from the forefront of scientific advance" in consequence of scientists" continuing commitment to a clinical service role. 16 Much of what is now seen as canonical work in the history of science and medicine was thus informed by an inherently teleological understanding of professionalisation as the ____________________ 12. Kohler 1982, pp. 6-7 . Kohler later notes that, prior to 1940, many American biochemistry departments retained a "close connection to clinical medicine" that "may appear to contradict the idea ... that biological chemists liberated themselves from clinical medicine" at this time. He resolves this apparent contradiction by arguing that the relationship was no longer one of dependence, but rather "a more or less equal partnership" in which "clinicians as well as biochemists were obliged to adapt their disciplinary ideals". Kohler 1982, p. 215 . Similarly equal partnerships are also seen to characterize new forms of "biomedicine" that emerged in the post-war years: Gaudillière 2002; Keating and Cambrosio 2003. 13. Geison 1987, p. 8. 14. For instance Morman 1984; Parascandola 1992; Prüll 1998 . 15. Butler 1988 Romano 1997. 16. Smith and Nicolson 1989, quoting p. 210. Increasingly, historians came to see such inter-professional tensions as the norm.
We can see this, for instance, in Keith Wailoo"s study of the reception of laboratory evidence for the existence of morphologically abnormal red blood cells in certain cases of anaemia. In an otherwise insightful analysis, Wailoo simply asserted the unsubstantiated claim that clinicians" scepticism regarding the significance of that evidence was "nurtured by the era"s pervasive tensions between the laboratory and the clinic"; only by "fully subordinating and standardizing laboratory technique to meet clinical interests" would clinical acceptance of the diagnostic status of sickle cells be achieved, he argued. 19 In effect, teleological assumptions about the supposed struggle for professional dominance had acquired explanatory status in their own right, without the need for further empirical demonstration.
____________________ 17. Hall 1976; Geison 1979; Maulitz 1979 . Less well known, but in similar vein, is Parascandola 1982 . Other studies showed how some doctors also drew on new forms of science to claim epistemic authority within medicine: e.g. Warner 1980 . 18. Jacyna 1988 . 19. Wailoo 1991 Against this tendency to suppose an inherent tension between the professional interests of science and medicine, we can set a growing body of research that takes a less agonistic view of professionalisation and discipline formation. More recent sociological analyses of professionalisation have moved on from considering how individual professions acquire authority and dominance, and have adopted a more systematic perspective on the negotiated alliances, inter-dependencies and jurisdictional boundaries that make possible a constantly shifting division of expert labour. 20 Some historians of science and medicine, too, have adopted such a perspective. Adele Clarke"s 1998 study of the emergence and consolidation of the field of reproductive science is a case in point.
Clarke is less interested than earlier historians of science and medicine in the pursuit of disciplinary independence or the defence of clinical dominance, and less inclined to privilege research and the work of scientific knowledge production over activities such as medical training or the provision of diagnostic services. That is not to deny that reproductive scientists" success in generating new knowledge was an important factor in determining precisely how and where their field came to be located within the larger patchwork of medical sciences and practices. But the epistemic work of knowledge production was only one element in the emergence and stabilisation of reproductive science, and cannot be seen in isolation from other processes including the production and exchange of research materials and the provision of other services to adjacent biomedical fields, among which clinical medicine was an important partner. 
Conflicting epistemologies
As Lawrence shows, a particularly important element in clinicians" defence of their professional authority was their articulation of a philosophy of medicine which insisted that while clinical practice might make use of science, it was not itself a science.
Lawrence enumerates several ways in which advocates of this view argued that medicine differed from science. Thus clinical medicine was seen to be oriented, not towards the production of natural knowledge, but towards the humane work of curing and caring for patients. Consequently, clinical knowledge was rooted in practical experience of individual cases of illness, and was necessarily holistic, intuitive and inductive. Ultimately, claimed the clinicians, medicine was an art, not a science; as such, it involved a distinct epistemology and methodology from that which characterised science. 36 Other historians have since documented further instances of this kind of holistic and humanistic rhetoric, as well as exploring the relationship between that rhetoric and the way clinical practice was organised and conducted. On the one hand, an unlikely assortment of radicals and conservatives began arguing that medicine was becoming overly scientific, and that a heartless pursuit of scientific values was proving inimical to the preservation of patients" rights and dignity. 38 On the other hand, medicine came under criticism from reformers who argued that medicine was not yet scientific enough, that too many of its procedures were unvalidated by statistical and other forms of scientific scrutiny, and that effective solutions to the ailments that beset society would only be secured through aggressive scientisation of the medical system. 39 In this ____________________ 36. Lawrence 1985a Lawrence , 1998 . See the various studies collected in Lawrence and Weisz (eds) 1998 . Also Cantor 1990 , 2002 , 2005 38. Prominent among the conservative critiques was Illich 1975. More radical critiques were fuelled by the emergence of the civil rights and other social movements : Rothman 1991 . 39. Berg 1994 Marks 1997. context, the claim that medicine should be understood as an art, not a science, acquired renewed salience as a means for doctors to rebut criticisms from both sides.
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Doctors were not alone in formulating this claim. Philosophers as eminent as
Stephen Toulmin rallied to medicine"s cause, articulating sophisticated epistemological reasons why medicine was an art which might draw on but could never be reduced to science. Their arguments involved contrasting the forms of empirical reasoning on which medical practice is based with those they considered to be characteristic of science. Thus where science is the pursuit of universal truths, medicine revolves around knowledge of sick individuals, and as such requires an understanding of complex, concrete particularities, not abstract generalisations; where science is analytic, medicine is holistic and synthetic;
where science proceeds through deductive reasoning, medicine relies upon inductive judgements; where science requires a critical distance from the object of inquiry, medicine involves a sympathetic and subjective identification with the patient and a hermeneutic understanding of their complaints. 41 Such rigorous philosophical arguments lent considerable credibility and gravitas to doctors" claims that medicine and science are fundamentally different kinds of enterprises, and that attempts to turn medicine into a science were therefore misguided.
This statement that medicine is not a science because it does not conform to scientific standards of epistemology is plainly an essentialist one: it turns on the presumption that science can be demarcated from non-science by noting the presence or absence of what are taken to be essential features of scientific observation and rationality.
More recently, however, work in post-Kuhnian philosophy and sociology of scientific knowledge has made clear that such epistemological essentialism is unsustainable. Among other things, this work argues that scientific knowledge itself involves knowledge of concrete particulars, and is itself necessarily inductive, holistic and hermeneutic. 1976; Engelhardt et al. 1979; Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981; and more recently, Gadamer 1996. 42. Kuhn 1970, pp. 189-90; Barnes 1982, pp. 45-53, 70-83; Forrester 1996; Nickles 2003; Creager et al. 2007. must itself be seen as a rhetorical move to delineate and defend a distinct sphere of jurisdiction or authority -an instance, in other words, of what sociologists of scientific knowledge call "boundary work".
For instance Toulmin
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This is borne out by a number of empirical studies which make clear the ideological and instrumental character of claims about the nature of clinical knowledge.
Talk of "holism", the "clinical art", and the irreducible character of medical experience and skill, all serve as malleable rhetorical resources, to be deployed in whatever way might best serve in to underwrite the status of clinical expertise. 44 Indeed, it might be noted that scientists too sometimes use the language of art to reinforce their own claims to expertise and authority. 45 Consequently, if we are to understand clinicians" use of such language, and their opposition of that language to what they identify as the dangers of science, we cannot adopt a realist reading. Rather, we must locate that usage in its specific social historical context, and analyse the particular purposes for which it was mobilised in that context.
Nonetheless, essentialist arguments about the supposed epistemological differences between science and medicine continue to be reproduced, not just by philosophers, but also by some working within social and cultural studies of medicine.
Most prominently, in her celebrated work on medical narratives, Kathryn Hunter expressly states that the narrative, hermeneutic, case-based character of clinical knowledge means that medicine cannot be a science. 46 Others, including some historians, have suggested that the fact that new clinical technologies were often developed on the basis of observation and experience, rather than through laboratory experimentation, should be seen as a further instance of clinicians" resistance to the epistemology of "scientific medicine". 47 In the absence of any evidence that clinicians actually saw new technologies in this light, such claims are pure speculation -albeit of a kind that evidently enjoys considerable credibility among historians of medicine.
____________________
43. See especially Gieryn 1983 Gieryn , 1999 Gordon 1988 . 44. Sadler 1988 Anderson 1992; Rosenberg 1998; Löwy 2008 . 45. Cambrosio and Keating 1988 . 46. Hunter 1991 47. For instance Hayter 1998.
Seeing cooperation
If interrogate that relationship, and in particular to refute overly cosy and triumphalist assumptions about the inevitable and beneficial progress of scientific medicine. There was thus an obvious attraction in uncovering instances of disagreement, and historians" accounts of such instances have since become part of the canon of our discipline.
At the same time, however, historians had an incentive to buy into the kind of oppositional rhetoric of science and medicine that became so prominent during the 1970s, and that remains salient to the present day. Many historians of medicine -particularly those whose professional commitments include the training of medical students -see their work not just as a contribution to historical scholarship, but as a means of helping doctors to reflect on their own place in society. In particular, ancillary teaching in the history of medicine is often justified as providing a humanistic counter-balance to the predominantly scientific training on offer in the rest of the medical curriculum. 55 Consequently, medical historians have a vested interest in perpetuating the same distinction between scientific and non-scientific values as commonly features in doctors" own rhetoric about the nature of their craft. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the emerging discipline of medical humanities, which is often explicitly framed as a means of reasserting the centrality of medical art and mitigating the supposedly dehumanising tendencies of scientific medicine. 56 But it is also evident in medical historians" inclination to assume an inherent tension between clinical humanism and the expansion of medical science.
Reasserting and reinforcing doctors" own rhetoric in this way is to do a disservice to the history of medicine, and perhaps to medicine itself. This is not just because a polarising historiography misrepresents the way that medicine and science have interacted with one another. It also vitiates historians" ability to comment constructively on what medicine is and might be. By reproducing claims that medicine is necessarily something other than science, medical historians embroil themselves in intra-and interprofessional debates over medical authority that they might more appropriately seek to analyse and 56. E.g. Hunter 1991, pp. xix, xxi.
